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SO NO DAMN POLITICIAN CAN EVER SCRAP IT:  THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Matthew H. Hawes*
We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and
political right to collect their pensions . . . .  With those taxes in there, no damn politician
can ever scrap my social security program.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt**
I.  INTRODUCTION
Is the nation’s old-age pension system bankrupt?  Each year brings
repeated warnings of a need for immediate reform.  Yet somehow, reasonable
people and even experts dispute both the severity of the crises and the scope
of the reforms, if any, that ought to be taken.  Completely overlooked in the
debate, however, are the legal and even constitutional limits to any
reformation plan.  President Roosevelt intended to create a program that
would withstand political compromise—a program that would create a “legal,
moral, and political right” to the receipt of benefits.  Nearly seventy years
after Social Security’s creation, we must ask:  Did Roosevelt succeed?
Any discussion of Social Security’s reform must begin with an
exploration of the program’s vulnerability.  When the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Bank urges Congress to cut future Social Security and Medicare
benefits for the sake of the nation’s economic health,1 and the Bush
Administration releases conservative estimates that the funding shortfall for
the two programs will reach eighteen trillion dollars over the next seventy-five
years,2 it certainly appears that Social Security is in danger.
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3. The Congressional Budget Office, a nonpartisan Congressional Agency tasked with analyzing
the economic effect of legislative action and inaction, publishes the Budget Options report as a tool to help
policymakers in the decision-making process.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET OPTIONS, Preface (Mar.
2003) [hereinafter CBO, BUDGET OPTIONS], available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/40xx/doc4066/EntireReport.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
4. Id. (italics added).
5. Id. at 254.
6. 2002 BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST FUNDS
ANN. REP. [hereinafter TRUSTEES’ 2002 REPORT], available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR02/
tr02.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
7. Paul Krugman, Editorial, Connect the Dots, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at A23.
8. Id.
9. Id.
Perhaps the clearest cry of alarm came from the nonpartisan
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).3  In its 2003 report, Budget Options, the
CBO describes Social Security and Medicare as two “looming strains” on the
country’s economy, and cautions, “[w]ithout changes to federal programs for
the elderly, the aging of the baby-boom generation will cause a substantial
deterioration in the fiscal position of the United States government.”4  Citing
the exponentially increasing cost of an unreformed Social Security program,
the CBO exhorts:  the nation must take action “sooner rather than later.”5
Yet not all agree.  Less than one year before the CBO 2003 report, and
shortly after the Social Security Trustees published their 2002 Annual Report
on the health of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) Trust Funds,6 Paul Krugman, a Princeton University professor of
economics and columnist for the New York Times, likened the concerns over
the imminence of Social Security’s insolvency to a scene from “Monty Python
and the Holy Grail.”  In the scene, a young man tries to convince an
undertaker to accept an old man who repeatedly insists, “I’m not dead.”7
“There isn’t any crisis,” writes Krugman,8 rather the program’s
predicament has been overstated—Social Security does not yet belong on
history’s scrap-heap of failed social programs.  Pointing out that the Trustees’
report revealed that Social Security can operate without change or reduction
in benefits three years longer than had been announced in the previous annual
report, Krugman summarizes, “the system looks good for 40 years.”9  Of
course if, like Krugman, we choose not to look beyond the next generation,
Social Security’s health is fine.
But notwithstanding Krugman’s short-term outlook, the repeated and dire
long-term predictions, even if overstated, are such that the perception that
Social Security faces long-term crisis is virtually unassailable.  In their 2003
Annual Report, the Social Security Trustees forecast exhaustion of the trust
2004] SO NO DAMN POLITICIAN CAN EVER SCRAP IT 867
10. 2002 BD. OF TRUSTEES, FED. OLD-AGE & SURVIVORS INS. & FED. DISABILITY INS. TRUST ANN.
REP. 3 [hereinafter TRUSTEES’ 2003 REPORT], available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR03/tr03.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  More specifically, the combined old-age insurance and disability insurance
trust fund will be exhausted in 2042.  Id. at 10 tbl.II.D1.  Individually, the old-age insurance trust fund’s
exhaustion is predicted in 2044, and the disability insurance trust fund’s exhaustion in 2028.  Id.  For a
more complete discussion of the predicted exhaustion and its meaning, see discussion, infra notes 100-03
and accompanying text.
11. Compare TRUSTEES’ 2002 REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 with TRUSTEES’ 2003 REPORT, supra note
10, at 13.  The annual change to the predicted exhaustion date is due, in part, to certain assumptions made
by the Trustees in formulating the economic models for their report.  For example, an assumed higher rate
of immigration is one significant factor which delayed the predicted exhaustion date for the 2003 report by
an additional year.  See TRUSTEES’ 2003 REPORT, supra note 10, at 13.
12. TRUSTEES’ 2003 REPORT, supra note 10, at 8.
13. The gross domestic product is the total market values of goods and services produced by workers
and capital within the United States’ borders during a given year.
14. CBO, BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 3, at 253.
15. See discussion infra Part II.D.i.
16. See Editorial, It’s Surprising but Roberts is Right, GREENSBORO NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Jan. 4,
2003, at A8, available at 2003 WL 5632472 (asserting “no one of even average intelligence believes” the
platform of a recent candidate that Social Security is not broke); Editorial, Social Insecurity Overhaul of
System Just Might Happen, DAILY OKLAHOMAN , Dec. 25, 2002, at 10A, available at 2002 WL 103885134
(“Young people understand better than what many of their elders obviously don’t:  Social Security will go
bankrupt without major changes.”); Steven Rattner, Big Shakeup!  Fresh Faces!  Political Capital!  Too
Bad All the Hoopla Doesn’t Come with Any Real Change in Economic Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2002,
at A35, available at 2002 WL 104306641 (criticizing the 2002 Bush tax cut when “Social Security is going
broke”).  It may be the case that thirty years of dire predictions have simply numbed the nation to the point
where it can no longer appreciate the scope of the current crisis.
fund in 2042,10 just one year later than their previous prediction.11  Exhaustion
of the trust fund means that, beginning the year that Americans born in 1975
would otherwise receive full Social Security benefits, retirees will receive, at
most, a mere seventy-three percent of their entitled payments.12  Even before
that point, the CBO calculates that, without significant reform, payments
under the current Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid programs will
consume fourteen percent of the gross national product13 in 2030, a cost
predicted to grow to twenty-one percent by 2075.14  At that point over one
dollar in five generated by the economic output of the nation will be consumed
in payments to retirees.
Why have these dire reports failed to trigger panicked attempts at reform
already?  One explanation may be that with the reports of the program’s
impending collapse dating back over thirty years,15 Americans already firmly
believe the program is in financial crisis.16  In fact, one opinion poll of
Generation X voters revealed that a greater number of young people believe
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17. Timothy J. Penny, Facts Are Facts, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, Sept. 4, 2003, at http://www.
nationalreview.com/nrof_comment/comment-penny090403.asp (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  Although
frequently used by advocates of reform as a proxy for opinions on private accounts, see Edward H. Crane,
President and CEO, Cato Institute, The Case for Privatizing America’s Social Security System, Address at
S.O.S. Retraite Santé, Paris, France (Dec. 10, 1997), at http://www.pensionreform.org/studies/crane.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004), this often cited poll has now been called into question.  In 1997, the Employee
Benefit Research Institute (EBRI), a nonprofit, nonpartisan public policy research organization, conducted
a study with the Gallup Organization yielding different results.  News Release, EBRI, Public Attitudes on
Social Security and Social Security and the UFO Fallacy (Apr. 7, 1998), available at
http://www.ebri.org/prrel/pr411.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  The president of EBRI, in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means, reported that
in its poll, 33% of generation X’ers believe UFOs are more likely to exist than Social Security upon
retirement.  The Future of Social Security for this Generation and the Next:  Current State of Public
Opinions as the Future of Social Security:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Soc. Sec. of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. (1997) (testimony of Dallas L. Salisbury, president of EBRI and
chairman of American Savings Education Council).  Though this report found fewer generation X’ers
believing in UFOs, there is hardly cause for celebration; one third of America’s youth remained absolutely
convinced in the ultimate collapse of Social Security.
18. Adam Nagourney & Richard W. Stevenson, Bush Advisers, With Eye on Dean, Formulate ‘04
Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2003, at A36.
19. NPR Talk of the Nation, Interview by Neal Conan, with Senator John McCain (Oct. 21, 2002),
available at 2002 WL 3297261.  Senator McCain cautioned that the challenge would only grow with both
the nation’s economic problems and the bankruptcy of major American corporations:  “[N]ow that we’re
back into the deficit situations, we’re taking away from the Social Security Trust Fund again . . . .  And,
by the way, the Social Security is not totally disconnected to the collapse of many pension systems in
America.”  Id.
20. CNNfn, Moneyline News Hour with Lou Dobbs (CNNfn television broadcast, Nov. 7, 2002),
Nov. 7, 2002, 2002 WL 6611221 (reporting on Senator Dole’s plan to create private Social Security
investment accounts).
in the existence of UFOs than in the likelihood Social Security will be
available to them upon their retirement.17
The politicization of the reformation debate, an outgrowth of the ever
approaching funding shortfall, also explains some of Congress’s failure to take
any ameliorative action.  Early predictions are that reform of the Social
Security program and the possibility of private investment accounts will factor
in the 2004 presidential race.18  Certainly candidates in the last national
campaign, the 2002 congressional elections, did not hesitate to declare Social
Security’s insolvency.  Senator John McCain, in an October 2002 interview
with National Public Radio, reported that “Social Security is by any measure
bankrupt.”19  Other politicians took even stronger positions.  In her 2002
senatorial campaign, Elizabeth Dole promised:  “I will not cut one single
penny from the benefits of anyone on Social Security, and I won’t vote to
increase payroll taxes.  I want to make Social Security stronger, or it will go
broke.”20  Federal Reserve Bank Chairman Alan Greenspan’s warnings to
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21. Bankruptcy is a legal status established by the courts, while insolvency is the more appropriate
term for the condition where liabilities exceed assets.  The Social Security Administration more often
chooses to use the term “exhaustion,” rather than insolvency or bankruptcy, to describe the condition of the
Social Security program upon the complete distribution of all funds that have been deposited in the trust
fund.  See supra text accompanying note 10.  Although both “insolvency” and “exhaustion” are more
legally precise, because the majority of the news media uses the term “bankruptcy,” and therefore the vast
majority of Americans similarly are apt to use the term as well, for purposes of this article, I too use the term
bankruptcy as a simple catch-all.
22. E.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, Bush Takes On Medicare, NAT’L REV., Feb. 24, 2003, at 21, available
at 2003 WL 11520734 (“Political pundits have long described Social Security as ‘the third rail of American
politics . . . .’”); Roger Simon, The Campaign Games Begin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 30, 2002,
at 65, available at 2002 WL 8432184 (discussing the likelihood that President Bush will attempt to reform
Social Security and thereby touch the legendary “third rail”).  Commentators, such as Michael Tanner of
the Cato Institute, have suggested that the Republican election victories in 2000 and 2002, victories
achieved even though the Republican platform advocates privatization of Social Security, are evidence that
the “third rail” is now dead.  See Susan Page, Social Security Debate May Be Ready to Reignite;
Democrats’ Weapon No Longer Has Its Partisan Power, USA TODAY, Dec. 3, 2002, at A11 (discussing
the possibility, and citing Michael Tanner for the view, that reforming Social Security is no longer instant
political death).  But this opinion is far from uniform.  See, e.g., David E. Rosenbaum, Economic View;
Hard Truths are Avoided on Social Security, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2002, § 3 (magazine), at 4 (criticizing
the opinion that George Bush’s election in spite of his campaign promise to reform Social Security means
it is no longer a “third rail”); John Harwood, Altered Landscape Doesn’t Divert Bush from Stated Agenda,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at A4 (“Republican strategists don’t buy White House political strategist Karl
Rove’s assertion that the third-rail of American politics—Social Security—has been unplugged . . . .”).  Not
to mention that Michael Tanner, a long-standing advocate for privatization, may simply be furthering his
own agenda by suggesting that to reform Social Security in today’s climate is no longer political suicide.
See Michael Tanner, Union Workers Should Support Social Security Privatization, CATO INSTITUTE,
Sept. 7, 1998, available at http://www.socialsecuirty.org/pubs/articles/bp-039.pdf (last visited Feb. 25,
2004); see also discussion supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.  Such manipulation, although
accomplished through overstating the threats to Social Security’s health, is precisely what Paul Krugman
accuses the Bush Administration of in his article following the 2002 Trustees’ Report.  See Krugman, supra
note 7.
Congress may well have been intended to further force reformation into the
presidential campaigns; but that does not mean that the nation will take action
any sooner.
How critical is immediate reform?  Of course, it is true that Social
Security, as Krugman quips, is “not dead,” and it is certainly not bankrupt.21
Rather, over the last thirty years, retirees have experienced numerous
inflation-adjusted increases in their benefit amounts.  Even in the midst of a
funding emergency and decades of deficit spending, politicians have never
tampered with this “third-rail” of American politics.22  Thanks to stopgap
measures over the last thirty years, our elderly receive their checks on a
regular basis and, at least for the near future, there is no risk of their
vanishing.
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23. One newspaper succinctly summed, “[t]he problem with Social Security is not that it is
completely bankrupt today, or even 10 years from today, but rather that it’s slowly dribbling away even as
baby boomers count their multiplying gray hairs.”  Jane Norman, Social Security Barbs Fly in Battle for
Votes, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 28, 2002, at A1, available at 2002 WL 100689928. 
24. SOC. SEC. ADM IN., YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT, FORM SSA-7005-SM-SI (2003)
[hereinafter YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT], available at http://www.ssa.gov/mystatement/
currentstatement.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  This 2003 individualized Social Security statement varies
markedly from the same report distributed to Social Security contributors in the previous year, conveying
a far greater sense of urgency for the program’s reforms.  In 2002, the Your Social Security Statement
merely called for the resolution of “long-range financial issues” and warned only of the approaching
exhaustion of the trust fund and the reduction in benefits.  By comparison, the 2003 statement not only
informs of the approaching trust fund exhaustion and the reduction of benefits, but also apprises of the
nation’s aging population and program’s imminent actuarial deficit in a mere fifteen years (the point at
which Social Security taxes will no longer exceed current payments to retirees).  Compare id. with SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT, FORM SSA-7005-SM-SI (2002) (on file with author).
25. Saul Friedman, Social Security, Invest or Keep a Sure Thing?, NEWSDAY , May 7, 2002, at B19,
available at 2002 WL 2741867.  Although one may speculate that Friedman’s opinion is equally as biased
as those of the think-tanks he criticizes, one thing is certain:  the Cato Institute has not been quiet in its
advocacy for reform.  Shortly after the 2002 mid-term elections the Cato Institute held a Capitol Hill
But make no mistake—the Social Security system is in peril.23  The
chicken-littles, while possibly premature in their cries, serve as harbingers of
the future.  Lower birth rates, increased longevity, and the ever advancing age
of the baby-boomer generation guarantee the eventual insolvency of the
system.  Krugman need only read his annual Social Security statement to
appreciate the calls for reform.  Provided by the Social Security
Administration (SSA), the agency tasked with maintaining the program, each
Social Security contributor is annually warned:
[I]n just 15 years we will begin paying more in benefits than we collect in taxes.  Without
changes, by 2042 the Social Security Trust Fund will be exhausted.  By then, the number
of Americans 65 or older is expected to have doubled.  There won’t be enough younger
people working to pay all of the benefits owed to those who are retiring.  At that point,
there will be enough money to pay only about 73 cents for each dollar of scheduled
benefits.  We will need to resolve these issues soon to make sure Social Security
continues to provide a foundation of protection for future generations as it has done in
the past.24
At least one commentator lays the blame for the recent and relative panic
over Social Security’s future with both libertarian and conservative think-
tanks.  These institutions, such as the Cato Institute and Heritage Foundation,
“have been campaigning for years to convert Social Security into individual
retirement accounts . . . .  And they’ve dominated the debate so far, shaking
confidence in Social Security’s financial future with cries that the wolf of
bankruptcy is just around the corner . . . .”25
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briefing entitled “The Third Rail is Dead.”  James G. Lakely, Democrats Cited for ‘Scare Tactics,’ Social
Security Reform Acceptable, 2 GOP Winners Say, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), Dec. 5, 2002, at A04, available
at 2002 WL 2922865.  The timing of the briefing can not be interpreted as anything other than a bid to
overcome reticence and encourage legislation during the next Congress.
26. CBO, BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 3, at 254.
27. Cato Institute, Answers to Frequently Asked Questions about Social Security, at http://www.
socialsecurity.org/faqs.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2003); Cato Institute, Do I Have a Right to Social
Security? (Jan. 13, 1999), at http://www.socialsecurity.org/daqilys/01-13-1999.html (last visited Dec. 26,
2003).
28. Flemming v. Nester, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).  See discussion infra Part III.
To date, the full predicted crisis, yielding a reduction in benefits or, even
more drastic, the complete termination of the old-age insurance system, never
materialized.  As a result of thirty years of congressional “fixes”—each
amendment postponing the bankruptcy of the program without a single
reduction in benefits—the government has created an environment where it
is reasonable to expect Congress to repair the program’s immediate problems
and remain, as it has for seventy years, virtually unaltered in all material
respects.  As a result, the nation is not prepared for the stark fact that this time
the program might no longer be salvageable through simple, minor
adjustments such as prospective changes to the retirement age.  Inaction, the
CBO warns, increases the likelihood of not only a reduction in the benefits for
future retirees, but also raises the real specter of a “need for an abrupt increase
in taxes or a cut in the benefits of all recipients.”26
But could Congress simply reduce the benefits of all recipients?
Roosevelt’s intention was to create a program granting legal, moral and
political rights to benefits.  In its advocacy for privatization of Social Security
accounts, the Cato Institute argues that, unlike private accounts, the
government has unlimited power under the current Social Security program
to tinker with benefits, or even eliminate benefits altogether.27  One forty-four-
year-old Supreme Court case might provide support for such a contention.
In the much criticized, McCarthy-era decision of Flemming v. Nestor,28
the Court determined that the government acted constitutionally in terminating
the social security benefits of a former member of the Communist party
through a retroactive law on the grounds that there was no protectable right to
continued payment of his benefits.  However, since the decision was handed
down in 1960, Nestor has never been revisited directly and the continued
viability of this decision due to subsequent welfare law decisions must be
questioned.
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29. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
30. See Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986); Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1973).
31. For the sake of simplicity, when I refer to Social Security, I mean only the old-age insurance plan
found in the original Social Security Act of 1935.  Beginning with the addition of disability insurance in
1956 and continuing with Medicare in 1965 and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 1974, the Social
Security Administration has been responsible for a broader range of social programs than provided for in
the original legislation.  The last two, Medicare and SSI, are distinctly different from the old-age pension
and the disability insurance plans as they were not intended to be self-sufficient.  Instead, funding of these
programs relies on contributions from the general treasury to supplement the contributions from employers
and employees.  Consequently, they more resemble welfare plans than insurance plans and have generally
been disregarded in this article.  Where I intend to include Medicare or SSI in my analysis, I make specific
reference to these programs.
In particular, just one decade later, the Court, in the case of Goldberg v.
Kelly,29 appeared to recognize broad property rights in the receipt of welfare
assistance.  Although ensuing decisions attempted to narrow Goldberg’s
holding, there is no question of an individual’s right to the continued receipt
of a vested benefit.30  The impact of Goldberg and its progeny on Social
Security, however, remains unaddressed.
In this article, I seek to explore the historical, legal, and societal aspects
of the federal old-age insurance plan as a justification for granting
constitutional protections to a contributor’s interest in Social Security—prior
to the receipt of any retirement benefits.31  I intend to address the issue
unaddressed in the case law:  When does an individual’s interest in Social
Security receive constitutional protections?
The hypothetical situation arises under the following question:  If the
Social Security system were to fail, resulting in a complete and instantaneous
termination of all benefits, would the contributing taxpayer have any
constitutional recourse?  Of course the total and complete bankruptcy of
Social Security is merely academic; the political ramifications of such an
event make it so remote as to be virtually laughable.  However, only by
exploring the outer limits of the government’s power to act can we be certain
that even more measured steps to reform Social Security will not impinge on
the rights of the program’s current and future beneficiaries.  As such,
discussion may provide a foundation for further analysis and debate on the
constitutional implications of the various plans to repair the approaching
exhaustion of Social Security.
The motives for the creation of the nation’s largest social program are
generally misunderstood.  Rather than simply a plan to eliminate the elderly’s
burden on society, the system had a multiplicity of goals with an underlying
purpose of easing the country out of the Depression.  In Part II, I discuss the
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societal and legislative foundations of the Social Security system and how
Social Security was intended to provide benefits as an earned right rather than
a governmental gift.  I explore the rationale behind the funding structure of the
old-age insurance plan, that requires equal contribution from both employers
and employees, and the intentions of its creators in designing it in this manner.
I next examine the amendments to the original Social Security Act, which
have led at least one commentator to describe the program’s history as a “tale
of two plans.”  And finally, I survey the current funding crisis as backdrop to
the need for reform.
In Part III, I explore the constitutional principles governing Social
Security.  Notwithstanding its decision in Fleming v. Nestor, the Supreme
Court’s decisions inadequately address the scope of an individual’s
protectable interests should Congress ever decide to terminate Social Security.
To this end, I analyze the Supreme Court’s welfare-Social Security-property
case law by exploring the inconsistencies and criticisms of the opinions.  I
investigate alternative theories, such as a contract theory and a “new property”
theory, for explaining the relationship between Social Security and the
individual.  In Part IV, using the existing case law, I then examine Social
Security’s seventy year history and its effects on an individual’s decision-
making.  By analyzing the pervasiveness of Social Security in modern
retirement planning and the reliance the government has precipitated through
its actions, I conclude with a discussion of how the government’s actions
created a right in future retirement benefits, which the existing law has
created, but not yet recognized, and inadequately protects.
II.  HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
Most likely believe Social Security origins lie in a Depression-era desire
to protect the elderly from poverty.  This is only a small part of the truth.  The
motivations behind the federal old-age insurance system are much more
complex, stemming from factors such as a desire to remove older Americans
from the workplace and constitutionality concerns over the program’s
structure.  Though misunderstood, the true conceptual foundations have had
an enormous impact on the program that is at once both good and bad.  On one
hand, the origins have immeasurably contributed to the creation of the future
funding crisis that Social Security now faces, while on the other they have
shaped the foundation of an individual’s rights to future benefits earned by
contribution.
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32. For an excellent discussion of the historical antecedents of modern old-age insurance, see
Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement:  Retirement Income and the Problem of Integrating
Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1085-1106 (1997).
33. Id. at 1110-12.
34. WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT:  THE MEANING OF AN AMERICAN
INSTITUTION, 1885-1978, at 132-33 (1980).
35. Id.  At the time of the Depression, the pension systems in America cannot be described as
anything but a failure.  As of 1932, eighty-five percent of all workers were not covered by any retirement
insurance whatsoever.  Id.  As for the fifteen percent that were actually covered, most pensions were
inadequate to keep retired workers out of poverty, and only five percent of those with a right to payments
were actually receiving them.  Id.
36. Veteran’s pensions as compensation for sacrifices to the nation were widespread, dating back
to the revolutionary war.  See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private:  The Rhetoric and Reality
of Social Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1026-27 (2000) (reviewing historical antecedents
to the Social Security Act of 1935 as perspective on the privatization debate).
37. The Civil Service Pension took nearly twenty-five years of political wrangling from first
conception in 1897 by the Secretary of the Treasury, to enactment on May 22, 1920 under President
Woodrow Wilson.  GRAEBNER, supra note 34, at 57.
38. See MARTHA DERTHICK, THE BROOK INGS INST., POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 231
(1979).
A.  To Help the Young (Not the Old)
At the time Social Security was created, the idea for a government-
organized old-age insurance plan was nothing new.32 A few vanguard
European nations had first established national old-age pension systems over
forty years earlier.33  In the United States, the first private pension plans date
back to 1875 with the pension plan established by the American Express
Company.34  By the turn of the century, many of the largest private
corporations had established pension plans, but these generally required
twenty or more years of service in exchange for limited payments.35
In contrast, until Social Security, the United States government had done
little to provide for the nation’s elderly.  Although it had dabbled in veteran’s
pension systems as far back as the Revolutionary War,36 broad-based social
insurance systems—plans that were not qualified upon service to the country
in times of war—found little favor in the United States.37  America was
founded on the principles of independence and self-determination.  The nation
was not eager to accept the premise that government, and not the family, had
a duty to care for the elderly.  Society as a whole was uncomfortable with the
concept of a mandatory welfare system for the nation’s retirees, as such a
program carried the stigma of the government dole.38  As no small
consequence, it took the need to aid young, able-bodied workers before
sufficient catalyst existed to overcome the psychological hesitance towards a
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39. GRAEBNER, supra note 34, at 194.
40. J. Douglas Brown, Philosophical Basis of the National Old Age Insurance Program, in PENSION
RES. COUNCIL, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS:  COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY? 1,
4 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1977).
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id. at 4.
43. In mid-1934, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created old-age security staff of the Cabinet
Committee on Economic Security (CES) for the express purpose of creating an old-age insurance system.
J. Douglas Brown, along with Barbara Armstrong, Murray Latimer, and Otto Richer, formed the CES.
These four individuals single-handedly created the program eventually enacted in the Social Security Act
of 1935.  GRAEBNER, supra note 34, at 184-90.
44. Brown, supra note 40, at 4.
45. See, e.g., GRAEBNER, supra note 34, at 184 (“The Social Security Act was, therefore, a piece
of retirement legislation, which promised to accomplish what other retirement legislation, had
accomplished—the removal of people from the workforce.”); Dilley, supra note 32, at 1067 (“Without a
legally enforceable expectation of a predictable level of income—whether from private pensions, savings,
or Social Security—until death, no worker could be expected to leave the work force voluntarily, which
after all is the essence of the twentieth century concept of retirement.”).
national old-age pension system.  Social Security resulted from a motivation
to help the young, not the old.
The 1930s witnessed years of depression and widespread unemployment.
Large segments of the population did not share in the phenomenal growth of
the industrial revolution.  Unemployed youth, their families lured to the cities
with the promise of opportunity, were pushed out of the workforce by
mechanization.39  Slowly, a realization set in that capitalism was not the
panacea for all of society’s ills.
Social unrest accompanied the economic crisis.  Sit-down strikes and
veteran protests in Washington emerged causing great concern.40  These new
threats challenged the very theories governing the country’s economic and
social policies from its birth; “laissez faire had lost its charm.”41
In this climate, Social Security was born.  A fear of violence, primarily
from the younger workers who blamed employers for their condition, was a
major factor in the creation and design of the separate unemployment
insurance and old-age insurance systems.42  But any solution to the rampant
unemployment and accompanying unrest had to account for the expectations
of the older, established, and generally still employed workers as well.
According to J. Douglas Brown, one of the founders of Social Security,43
“[t]hose over 65, however, were too old to fight.  They looked to the federal
government to respect their rights as citizens . . . .”44
The solution reached by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Security
(CES) was to encourage the removal of older, superannuated individuals from
the workforce by providing sufficient pension payments upon retirement.45  In
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other words, Social Security, was not a system founded upon humanitarian
principles or feelings of beneficence toward the elderly.  Instead, it was seen
as a means to address both unemployment and social unrest simultaneously
through encouraging the retirement of those workers who had not saved for
old-age or otherwise would not be able to support themselves without
working.
Of course other factors influenced the old-age insurance plan.
Considerations such as increasing consumer spending and capital investment
in the national economy, and addressing the deterioration of the family
support structure caused by the industrial revolution certainly were part of the
equation.46  However, a significant hurdle remained; none of these
justifications, let alone the creation of economic opportunity for the young and
able-bodied worker, were adequate to receive the nation’s, not to mention the
Supreme Court’s, approval.
Consequently, Social Security was packaged for the country and the
Supreme Court as a welfare program providing a broad-based safety-net to
keep the elderly out of poverty.47  To reach the ultimate conclusion that the
Social Security Act of 1935 was constitutional under both the welfare clause48
and Congress’s power to tax,49 the Court found that Congress was responding
to a national crisis of poverty amongst the elderly.50  The Court even cited
extensive congressional hearings that support the notion that poverty was the
primary motivation.51
But regardless of the legislative record, the structure of the benefits
system, with a qualifying contribution level and fixed retirement age, provides
the greatest insight into the true motivations behind the old-age insurance
program.  If relieving poverty of the elderly was the primary purpose of Social
Security, the system might have been drafted to provide income to those
elderly who voluntarily retire.  After all, if someone is still capable of
working, they are still capable of earning—there is no need to prevent
poverty.52  Instead, the CES fixed the retirement age below the age at which
all individuals would no longer physically be capable of working.  Not only
that, but a qualified taxpayer may choose to take an early retirement with
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reduced benefits—an option that encourages those who have saved over a
lifetime of working to depart the workforce.
This is not intended to completely discount the goal of providing income
for the elderly in their retirement.  Certainly, the collapse of the stock market
followed by the virtual disintegration of the entire banking structure decimated
the savings of an entire generation.  However, providing for the elderly was
in large part a pretextual justification used to sell the nation on the old-age
insurance plan.  The removal of the older workers from the nation’s factories
was the primary goal; replacing the lost savings of millions of individuals to
liberate them from the need to continue working was the means to an end.
The Social Security system was revolutionary—it would provide old-age
security to nearly all of the nation’s elderly.  It was cheap—funded and
administered by contributions from employers and workers, and not requiring
additional general taxes until well into the future.  It was
self-sufficient—contributions from younger workers would fund the benefits
paid to retired workers.  But it was also far from perfect.
B.  The Ever Growing Problem
Despite being advertised as a self-perpetuating social insurance plan, the
Social Security system has been at risk since its inception.53  J. Douglas
Brown concedes the founders knew the program would not remain solvent and
estimated that government contributions would be necessary as early as 1967
in order to stave off the plan’s collapse.54  Writing in 1977, he noted that “as
the number of beneficiaries increased, . . . [the] reserve,” which is a limited
purpose, contingency trust fund designed to protect from short-term
fluctuations, “would be insufficient to avoid the need for a sharper rise in the
[tax] contribution rate than then seemed feasible.  It was at this point that a
government contribution would be necessary.”55
Congress, however, has consistently rejected calls for support from
general revenues.56  Even in times of fiscal crisis, legislators refused to turn
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61. J. Douglas Brown recorded that not only was constitutionality a factor in design of the system,
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to this alternative source of funding, preferring to maintain a “self-supporting”
system—at least in common expectation.
Such expectations were quickly dispelled when in 1972, a twenty percent
benefits increase coupled with a change in the formula for inflation
adjustments led to the first official report of a long-range deficit.57  A
prediction of the complete exhaustion of the trust fund within twenty years
spurred debate over the need for significant new sources of revenue.58
Although faced with a critical shortfall, Congress rejected President Jimmy
Carter’s proposal to use general funds to shore-up Social Security in 1977.59
Instead, Congress felt that it was more politically feasible to raise the wage
base (the maximum income upon which contributions are calculated) for both
employers and employees and to raise the payroll tax rate.60
It is particularly telling that Congress decided to raise taxes, a move
generally considered political suicide, rather than simply reallocate funds
under the existing tax structure.  In doing so, Congress rejected a plan that
would have made Social Security more like a true welfare program.  Instead
of taking money from general revenues and redistributing it to the elderly,
Congress continued the program under the strict principle of individual
contributions.
Although the crisis came as a shock to the nation in the 1970’s, Social
Security’s inherent flaws were known ab initio by its founders and its
proponents.  So how could such a revolutionary program be implemented even
though it contained a potentially fatal defect?  The answer lies in 1935 and the
challenges of ensuring that Social Security could even be realized.
C.  Funding the Trust
In the push to establish a plan that would withstand constitutional
scrutiny,61 the CES made a conscious decision to postpone addressing the
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employment, as opposed to an individual income tax which would have demanded per capita application
throughout the country.  See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 578-81 (1937).  In addition, prior
to the program’s withstanding Supreme Court scrutiny, its proponents sought to disassociate any link
between the tax and the benefits, even going so far as to significantly separate them in distinct provisions
within the statute itself.  Only one Senator peered behind the curtain during debates over the Act’s passage
stating “Congress, in titles II and VIII, knowing it cannot directly collect premiums to pay compulsory old-
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64. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
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long-term funding challenge.62  The mandatory withholdings by employers,
put into effect almost immediately, provided a basis for an instant
constitutional challenge.  But the benefits, the CES rationalized, not scheduled
to begin for another seven years, did not require fine-tuning.  Instead, the
funding problem was to be passed on to the First Advisory Council, a twenty-
five member committee scheduled to be established immediately following a
Supreme Court determination that the plan was constitutional.63
The CES’s concerns as to the Act’s constitutionality were quickly put to
rest.  Two years after passage of the statute, the Supreme Court, in companion
cases Helvering v. Davis64 and Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,65 held
the Social Security Act constitutional.  The CES had achieved its goal; the
Court found that Congress had operated within its powers of taxation and
authority to promote the general welfare when it enacted the statute.  It was
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1937, and the Advisory Council would have time to create a plan for
implementing one of the most sweeping social programs ever undertaken in
the country; after all, benefits were not due to begin until 1942.66
However benefits began in 1940 under an accelerated plan that provided
a benefits program far more extensive than that found in the 1935 Act.67
Rather than addressing the future funding shortfall, the Advisory Council
turned its attention to matching current outlays to early excess revenues.  In
addition to the basic old-age retirement pension that was part of the original
program, the Advisory Council created a benefit structure that provided Social
Security payments to wives, widows and surviving children as well.  In all
fairness, the CES had considered such an expansion advisable, but it was the
desire to match revenues generated to the benefits paid that permitted the
realization of the expansion.68
If the taxes were generating more income than the program administrators
wanted, why didn’t they simply place it in a trust that could fund the expected
future shortfall?  This is a difficult question to answer, particularly in light of
the CES’s early expectations that the program would require government
contribution before 1970.69  J. Douglas Brown, elected as chairman of the First
Advisory Council following his service with the CES, records that “[t]he
council recognized the need and justification for government sharing of cost,
but recognized, as had the staff of the committee, that the contributions of the
government should be postponed until the changing balance of tax income and
benefit disbursements required such contributions.”70
Although the intention had been to create a self-perpetuating system, the
1940 decision to accelerate benefits and expand the class of beneficiaries was
made unmistakably at the expense of a fully funded reserve.  According to
Martha Derthick, in order to achieve the self-funding the drafters desired, an
accumulation of a $47 billion reserve fund by 1980 was planned.71  This plan
came under attack by Republicans in 1937 as the First Advisory Council
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established their agenda for implementing benefits under the Act.72  The
Republicans believed that the temptation presented by excess revenues would
be too much to resist, resulting in either liberalizing benefits or spending the
money as part of the general treasury.73  Consequently, to avoid collecting
significantly more money than was being paid, the Advisory Council found it
necessary to expand the qualified benefit recipients.  In amazing circular logic,
the expansion of beneficiaries was implemented to eliminate the temptation
to liberalize benefits thereby solidifying Social Security’s funding shortfall for
all future generations.
J. Douglas Brown contends that the decision to provide only contingency
financing rather than a fully funded reserve was made by the CES over the
objections of Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau.74  The Committee
determined that a full, traditional trust was unnecessarily redundant; a fully
funded reserve, invested in government bonds, offered the same guarantees
that came from the government’s ability to generate revenue to pay the
bonds.75  In addition, a contingency reserve avoided problems of deflationary
withdrawal to accumulate reserves and challenges of managing a huge
investment fund.76  In any event, having withstood constitutional scrutiny of
their program and anxious to spend the revenue it was collecting, Congress
swiftly authorized the payment of benefits a full two years earlier than
originally intended.
D.  A Tale of Two Plans
In a rather poetic twist, a law firm secretary, Ida Fuller, was the Social
Security program’s first beneficiary.77  She received $22 each month for thirty-
five years until her death at an age of over 100 years old.78  During Ida Fuller’s
life, Social Security, and even more to the point, the old-age insurance
program, underwent massive transformations.  The clearest reflection of the
transformations is witnessed in the contribution structure.  At the time the
Social Security Act went into effect, Ida Fuller and her law firm each
contributed 1% of her income up to a wage base of $3,000.79  Twenty years
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later, in 1960, the contribution rate increased for both employer and employee
to 2.75% and the wage base to $4,800.80  Today the contribution rate has
increased to 5.3% on a wage base of $84,900.81  At the turn of the twentieth
century, approximately 39 million beneficiaries received payments averaging
almost $10,000 per year.82  Even adjusted for inflation, Ida Fuller’s $22
represents just over one-third of what the Social Security beneficiary receives
today.83
i.  1972 Amendments
One commentator suggests that there have been two Social Security
plans—the one originally created in 1935 and a contemporary one created by
the massive overhaul of the system in 1972.84  Arguably, the most drastic
modification made by Congress changed the manner in which benefits were
adjusted from year-to-year.  Under the original plan, Congress would
occasionally, on an ad hoc basis, adjust the benefits level to reflect cost of
living increases for the elderly.85  But with the 1972 amendments, the benefits
thereafter automatically adjusted for inflation, removing one of the ways in
which Congress historically accommodated unexpected shortfalls.86  In
addition, on Advisory Council recommendation, Congress reduced Social
Security’s financing to meet the current costs and finance the trust fund to
satisfy only one year’s expenditures.87  This change marked a significant shift
from the previous policy of ensuring that the revenue was sufficient to provide
small, annual increases in the trust fund, which would be maintained at a level
exceeding annual costs.88
Nonetheless, neither of these two financing modifications would likely
have been significant enough to bring about a new era in Social Security were
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it not for a combination of other factors—a combination which, in the
aggregate, caused the program’s first real crisis.  First, financing changes were
implemented not merely to reduce the size of the trust, but to fund an
immediate increase of nearly twenty percent in the amount of benefits being
paid.89  In addition, the program was no longer expanding to encompass new
classes of employees.90  Finally, a significant economic downturn arrived at
the same time the new financing plan was implemented.91  Increased
unemployment and rapid inflation brought about decreased revenues and
increased costs.  In 1973, the Social Security Trustees’ Annual Report
included a projected shortfall over the next seventy-five years.92  Social
Security was faced with its first actuarial deficit.93
The policy debate on how to fix the deficit raged.  Some recommended
contribution from the general treasury,94 while others advocated less drastic
action.  Ultimately, in 1977, Congress began by increasing both the tax rate
as well as the wage base rate.95  In addition, the 1972 amendment tying
benefits to the consumer price index was repealed.96  Such measures, however,
were only stop-gap.  The cumulative effect of congressional tinkering and
attendant reticence to alter the program’s benefit structure remained which
virtually guarantees the aging baby-boomers will one day bring Social
Security to the brink of collapse.
ii.  Social Security Today
A snapshot of a single year’s balance sheet makes one wonder how we
ever came to crisis.  Net contributions to the OASI trust fund totaled $455.2
billion in 2002.97  In contrast, only $388.1 billion in net benefits were paid
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103. Id. at 10 tbl.II.D1.  The date for trust fund exhaustion is most often reported as 2042 in most
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104. See id.
105. Id. at 10.
during the same period.98  With approximately 39.2 million beneficiaries
receiving payments,99 the average beneficiary received payments of nearly
$10,000 during that year.
Yet, even though the OASI trust fund has not witnessed a decrease in net
assets since 1982,100 it is now almost axiomatic that the program will
eventually be unable to make full benefit payments.  The long anticipated
gradual retirement of the baby-boom generation, coupled with continued low
birth rates and increased life expectancy, all contribute to a problem for the
future.101  Under the Social Security Trustees’ “best estimates,”102 the
intermediate actuarial assumptions for the future of Social Security, the OASI
trust fund is anticipated to be exhausted in 2044.103
But even this “best estimate” for total depletion of the trust fund
understates the problem.  A better reflection of the challenges facing Social
Security can be found in the fact that beginning in 2018, and increasing as
rapidly as the baby-boomer generation retires, the program will operate in the
red.104  Under the current rates and schedules, the anticipated costs of the
benefits owed will outstrip revenues generated by contributions in just fifteen
years.  Discounted to the present value, the combined unfunded obligation of
the combined old-age and disability insurance programs due through 2077
totals $3.5 trillion dollars.105
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III.  ENTITLEMENT AND OWNERSH IP—THE FRAMEWORK FOR LEGAL
PROTECTIONS
A.  Fifth Amendment Entitlement
Such a crisis necessitates firm, strong action.  Needless to say, no such
action has been forthcoming and as the massive voting block that is the baby-
boom generation approaches retirement it will only become more difficult for
Congress to take the necessary steps to protect the program for all future
beneficiaries.  Today’s economists generally agree that any plan to save Social
Security from certain bankruptcy requires significant overhaul of the current
benefit structure.106  Without action, the prognosis for Social Security is
dismal.  With action, its future improves.  However, with each passing year,
more drastic action will be required.  Undergirding, and in some respects
constraining, any congressional action are critical constitutional and legal
rights which have never been fully explored.  Chief among these are a
contributor’s property and contract rights to the receipt of Social Security
benefits after a lifetime of making contributions.
Under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the federal
government cannot deprive an individual of property without due process of
law.107  This concept, like most constitutional matters, is deceiving in its
simplicity; the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides no definition
of property and no explanation of the scope of the due process right.108
The basic principle behind the constitutionally protected property interest
has been well established by the Supreme Court.  Where traditional private
property (e.g., real property109 and chattels,110 as well as its ancillary forms
such as choses in action111) is concerned, an individual has a right to an
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evidentiary hearing and “just compensation.”112  Most disputes in this area,
however, revolve around whether government action deprived the claimant of
something of value113 and whether or not compensation is owed,114 not
whether the claimant has a right to the property claimed.
When evaluating government action concerning government benefits,
such as Social Security or state or federal welfare programs, individuals are
entitled to due process “only if they have a constitutionally protected property
interest.”115  Such a property interest is not created by the Constitution, but
from an independent source such as state law.116  This source might take the
form of a welfare benefit’s administrative and statutory eligibility standards,
like those at issue in Goldberg v. Kelly,117 or tenure provisions in public
university employment.118
A mere expectation of continued receipt of a governmental benefit is not
sufficient to confer a protectable interest.  In an often quoted phrase, the
Supreme Court explained:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract
need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He must,
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.  It is a purpose of the ancient
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives,
reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.119
B.  Denying the Entitlement:  Fleming v. Nestor
By design, Social Security was intended to create benefits as a matter of
right.120  Under the statute, qualifying for benefits was at the outset, and
remains today, a simple matter:  an individual need merely have contributed
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126. Id. at 603.  Nestor’s wife remained eligible for Social Security benefits “as the wife of an insured
individual.”  Id. at 606 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)).
127. Id. at 605-06.
128. Id. at 621 (Black, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 605.
130. Id. at 621 (Black, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 606.
132. Id. at 609-10.
a minimum amount to the program,121 reached a certain age,122 ceased
working,123 and filed a claim.  Such a formula appears to create a right to the
benefits, but courts have been hesitant to recognize and protect that right.
In the 5-4 decision of Flemming v. Nestor124 the Supreme Court held that
the Social Security Act conferred very little in the way of an entitlement.  “To
engraft upon the Social Security system a concept of ‘accrued property rights’
would deprive it of the flexibility and boldness in adjustment to ever-changing
conditions which it demands.”125
In Nestor, the Court was asked to decide whether the termination of
Social Security benefits being paid to the wife of a deported retiree violated
the Fifth Amendment.126  Ephram Nestor, an alien who had emigrated from
Bulgaria in 1913 began receiving old-age insurance benefits in 1955,127 after
working and paying his contribution to Social Security for eighteen years.128
In July 1956, Nestor was deported pursuant to a then recently enacted
immigration law permitting the immediate deportation of communists and
former communists;129 Nestor’s deportation came fifteen years after he left the
Communist Party.130  Shortly after his deportation, his Social Security
benefits, being paid to his wife, were terminated.  Nestor brought suit on the
grounds that the termination of the benefits was a taking of an accrued
property right without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment.131
The Court recognized that Social Security was a form of social insurance,
but refused to analogize it to an annuity where the individual’s receipt of
payments is contractually tied to premiums paid.132  While certainly
reasonable to expect that a worker, who is supporting payments to current
beneficiaries, will eventually become a beneficiary himself, the Court
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133. Id. at 610.
134. See id. at 610-11 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1304).
135. See id. at 611.
136. Id.  In addition to claiming that the Social Security benefits were an accrued property right,
Nestor challenged the law calling for termination of the benefits following deportation, authorized on the
basis of his past membership in the Communist Party, as an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation
of Article I, section 9, clause 3 of the Constitution (“No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed
[by the Congress].”).  Id. at 612-13, 613 n.6; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
Historically, a bill of attainder was a law passed by a legislature to punish an individual for
advocating, attempting, or conspiring to overthrow the government.  United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
441 (1965).  Used extensively during the 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries in England, bills of attainder and
related acts not only sentenced the subversive individual to death, but also punished the family of the
attained with penalties including prohibiting his or her heirs from inheriting property, restricting their right
to vote, and even banishment.  Id. at 441-42.  In modern times, the Supreme Court has explained,
“‘[l]egislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial
are bills of attainder prohibited by the Constitution.’”  Id. at 448-49 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328
U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946)).
Much to the chagrin of the dissent, see Nestor, 363 U.S. at 626-27 (Black, J., dissenting), the Court
in Nestor held that the law requiring forfeiture of Nestor’s Social Security benefits was not intended as
punishment for his membership in the Communist Party and therefore did not constitute bill of attainder.
Id. at 617.  Relying, in large part, on the fact that the provision mandating the termination of benefits when
the recipient was deported for specified acts was not accompanied with an expression of congressional
purpose, the Court found no constitutional infirmity.  Id.  “[T]he presumption of constitutionality . . .
forbids us lightly to choose that reading of the statute’s setting which will invalidate it over that which will
save it.”  Id.  In essence, the Court refused to find that the grounds for Nestor’s deportation, membership
in the Communist Party, and the attendant benefits termination constituted punishment because the statute
required termination of benefits when deportation was ordered for illegal entry and conviction of a crime,
in addition to Communist Party membership—the subversive activity and sole basis for Nestor’s
deportation who otherwise was legally in the United States and had committed no crime.  Id. at 619-20.
Therefore, the Court reasoned, the case was still “a far cry from the situations . . . in [previous decisions
where laws were found to be bills of attainder] where the legislation was on its face aimed at particular
individuals.”  Id. at 619.
Interestingly, if today’s Court were to review Nestor’s claim it would likely reach a different result.
Just five years after Nestor, the Court, in United States v. Brown, struck down a provision of the Labor-
reasoned the amount of his benefits is not “dependent on the degree to which
he was called upon to support the system.”133  Furthermore, the Court found
that Congress’s reservation of a right to alter, amend, or terminate any
provision in the statute undermined all claims of accrued rights in the benefits
conferred.134
Instead, the Court held that the Due Process Clause provides only the
flimsiest of protections from arbitrary government action.135  It explained:
“Particularly when we deal with a withholding of a noncontractual benefit
under a social welfare program such as this, we must recognize that the Due
Process Clause can be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests
a patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification.”136
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Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 which imposed a fine or imprisonment for a member
of the Communist Party who served as an officer or employee of a labor union.  Brown, 381 U.S. at 462.
Rejecting the government’s contention that the law was preventative not punitive as evidenced by the
application to all members of the Communist Party rather than to individuals, the Court stated “[w]e cannot
agree that the fact that [this law] inflicts its deprivation upon the membership of the Communist Party
rather than upon a list of named individuals takes it out of the category of bills of attainder.”  Id. at 461.
“[T]he decisions of this Court, as well as the historical background of the Bill of Attainder Clause, make
it crystal clear that these are distinctions without a difference.”  Id.  The Court explained that Congress may
permissibly seek to reduce the influence of dangerous people in the labor movement but it “must
accomplish such results by rules of general applicability.  It cannot specify the people upon whom the
sanction it prescribes is to be levied . . . .  [T]he task of adjudication must be left to other tribunals.”  Id.
137. See Mark Pettit, Jr., Modern Unilateral Contracts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 551, 576-77 (1983).
138. Id. (citing CHARLES FRIED, CONTR ACT AS PROMISE 1 (1981)).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (1981).
140. Pettit, supra note 137, at 576.
141. Id. at 578.
142. Id. (citing Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publ’g Co., 270 N.Y.S.2d 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966), rev’d,
235 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1968) (severance pay)); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 533 P.2d 339 (Or.
1975) (finding twenty-two-year custom of paying a pension to non-union employees bound the employer);
Thatcher v. Wasatch Chem. Co., 507 P.2d 365 (Utah 1973) (finding employees expected bonuses would
be paid to supplement paycheck); Simon v. Riblet Tramway Co., 505 P.2d 1291 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973)
(finding bonus paid over ten year period ripened into an implied contract for compensation).
C.  An Earned Right:  Criticisms of Nestor
i.  Contract Theory and Justice Black’s Dissent
Although specifically declaring Social Security as a “noncontractual
benefit,” the Nestor Court failed to provide any cognizable explanation as to
why the old-age insurance program did not function as a contract between the
contributing worker and the government like more traditional pension systems.
Such cursory treatment, however, is not surprising when one conducts an
analysis of a contract theory for Social Security.
It is a basic principle that a promise can create a unilateral contract.137  A
promise is a self-created, self-imposed obligation.138  The Second Restatement
of Contracts explains that a promise is “a manifestation of intention to act or
refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promise in
understanding that a commitment has been made.”139  That is not to say a
promissory contract can only be entered into expressly; “whether it is
appropriate to infer a promise depends on the facts of each case . . . .”140
Even where a court does not find express promissory language, it will not
hesitate to infer a promise.141  In an employment situation such an inference
might be grounded in nothing more than a past pattern of paying benefits.142
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143. See discussion supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
144. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) (“It is apparent that the noncontractual interest
of an employee covered by the [Social Security] Act cannot be soundly analogized to that of the holder of
an annuity, whose right to benefits is bottomed on his contractual premium payments.”).
145. Id. at 610-11.
146. See id. at 609-10.
147. See discussion infra notes 239-49 and accompanying text.
148. Pettit, supra note 137, at 578.
149. Id. (citations omitted).
150. See id. at 578-79 (citing Davis v. Ala. Power Co., 383 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Ala. 1974), aff’d, 542
F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976), aff’d, 431 U.S. 581 (1977)).
151. Id. at 579 n.129.
152. Id. at 579.
Certainly such a past pattern is implicated in the case of Social Security
payments where, even as of Flemming v. Nestor, neither current nor even
future beneficiaries have ever been faced with a reduction in scheduled
benefits.143
Because the Nestor Court provides no clear explanation, analysis, or
support, one can only speculate how it reached the conclusion that Social
Security does not create a contract between the beneficiary and the
government.144  Perhaps the Supreme Court’s rationale rests upon the premise
that Congress specifically reserved the right to alter or amend the program,145
thereby disclaiming any possibility of an implied promise.  It certainly cannot
be based upon the suggestion that a worker’s retirement benefits are not tied
to the contributions made during employment as implied by the Court.146  That
benefits are contingent upon sufficient contribution is, and always has been,
one of the basic foundations upon which the old-age insurance plan is built.147
As already stated, courts are willing to find implied contracts, particularly
in employment situations.148  Whether out of a sense of equity or a desire to
enforce obligations, “[i]f a personnel manual or statement of company policy
contains a description of existing benefit plans, courts often infer a promise
that the employer will maintain these plans as described, even though . . . the
future existence of the plans [is never mentioned].”149  Even where employers
specifically disclaim an intention to create contracts for continuations of
benefits, courts look to the substance of the transaction to find a unilateral,
contractual obligation.150  Whether the approach simply constitutes
reimbursing reliance151 or an actual finding of obligation, “[i]t seems . . .
defensible to say that sometimes actions speak louder than words . . . .”152
In one recent case, the Supreme Court looked through the strict form of
a legislative disclaimer to identify the substance of the underlying action in a
manner similar to the string of employment cases in which courts have found
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153. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
154. Id. at 392.
155. Id. at 391 (“[I]ts authorizing statute declares that it ‘will not be an agency or establishment of
the United States Government.’”) (citation omitted).
156. Id. at 392.
157. Id. at 400.
158. Id. at 392 (citations omitted).
159. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
160. Id. at 577.
161. Id. at 576.
162. Id. at 577.
implied unilateral contract cases.  In Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp.,153 the Court was asked to determine whether Amtrak, a privatized
corporation created by congressional action, was a government actor for
purposes of a claim the rail carrier violated an artist’s First Amendment rights.
Amtrak argued that it was a private corporation, wholly distinct from the
government.154  In support of its claim, Amtrak pointed to a disclaimer of
status as an agency of the government found in the authorizing legislation.155
Rejecting Amtrak’s argument, the Court held that the disclaimer can only
affect those powers within Congress’s authority to eliminate.156  Because
Congress reserved the right to appoint a majority of the board of directors,
Congress did not have the ability to deny Amtrak’s status as a government
agency.157
We have no doubt, for example, that the statutory disavowal of Amtrak’s agency status
deprives Amtrak of sovereign immunity . . . .  But it is not for Congress to make the final
determination of Amtrak’s status as a Government entity for purposes of determining the
constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions.158
Prior to Flemming v. Nestor, the Supreme Court in Lynch v. United States
refused to allow Congress to disclaim its promises to pay beneficiaries under
the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917.159  Distinguishing the War Risk
Insurance Act from gratuities such as pensions and compensation
allowances,160 the Lynch Court found that the war risk policies were
contracts.161  Although entered into for benevolent purposes, the policies
represented an agreement between the beneficiaries and the government—in
exchange for premiums, the Court found the government became obligated to
pay insurance for injuries incurred in war.  Gratuities, the Court held, “involve
no agreement of parties . . . .  The benefits . . . may be redistributed or
withdrawn at any time in the discretion of Congress.”162  The Court continued,
“[o]n the other hand, War Risk policies, being contracts, are property and
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163. Id.
164. Id. at 579-80.
165. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960).
166. Id. (citing Lynch, 292 U.S. at 576-77).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 622 (Black, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 623 (Black, J., dissenting).
171. See discussion infra Part III.C.
172. See discussion infra Part III.C; see also Brown, supra note 40, at 4.
create vested rights.”163  Consequently, Congress’s attempt to repudiate the
contract constituted a Fifth Amendment violation.164
In Flemming v. Nestor, the Supreme Court barely acknowledged the
existence of Lynch.165  Writing for the majority, Justice Harlan explained with
a “cf” signal to the Lynch case citation, “[i]t is hardly profitable to engage in
conceptualizations regarding ‘earned rights’ and ‘gratuities.’”166  The Court
acknowledged that “[t]he ‘right’ to Social Security benefits is in one sense
‘earned’” but this merely means that the contributors “may justly call upon
[the] economy, in their later years, for protection from ‘the rigors of the poor
house.’”167  Such a claim might very well have merit if Social Security were
designed to draw up on the general revenue from the “economy” to pay
benefits.  But in a self-sufficient program, intentionally funded entirely
through Social Security tax receipts, assertions that beneficiaries may “call
upon [the] economy” are specious at best.168
In his dissent, Justice Black criticized the Court’s cursory conclusions:
that Lynch was inapplicable, and that the Social Security Act merely conferred
a right to “justly call” for help in old age.169  Justice Black wrote:
These are nice words but they cannot conceal the fact that they simply tell the
contributors to this insurance fund that despite their own and their employers’ payments
the Government, in paying the beneficiaries out of the fund, is merely giving them
something for nothing and can stop doing so when it pleases.  This, in my judgment,
reveals a complete misunderstanding of the purpose Congress and the country had in
passing that law.  It was then generally agreed, as it is today, that it is not desirable that
aged people think of the Government as giving them something for nothing.170
As Justice Black so competently points out, the very design of the
contributory funding scheme for Social Security was to ensure it did not bear
the imprint of the public dole.171  Rather than being a gratuity subject to the
generosity of the government, benefits were conceptualized as an individually
earned right—a right earned through contributions.172  Quoting Senator
George, the Chairman of the Finance Committee, Justice Black continued:
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173. Nestor, 363 U.S. at 623 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting 102 CONG. REC. 15110 (1992)
(statement of Sen. George)) (emphasis added).
174. Id. at 624-25 (Black, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (Black, J., dissenting).  Where it suited its needs, however, the Supreme Court in Bowen v.
Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986), applied a “social security
as a contract”-type analysis to find grounds for reversing a district court that held state employees had a
property interest in the right to opt-out of the Social Security program.  Id. at 43.  See Michael W.
McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights:  A Case Study in the Relationship Between Individual
Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REV. 267, 273-74 (1988) (noting “[t]he Court’s
reasoning is somewhat unclear . . . ,” but seems to rely on a contracts clause analysis whereby Congress had
given notice of a right to alter or amend the terms of the agreement).
Under the original plan for the old age insurance system, state employees were excluded from
coverage to ensure the new statute would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc.
Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. at 44.  Fifteen years later, Congress amended the Social Security Act to provide
an opportunity for states to elect coverage for their employees, with an additional right to terminate
participation after providing two years advanced notice.  Id. at 44-45.  After Congress revoked the right to
opt-out in 1983, approximately 71,000 state employees in California brought suit claiming, in part, that the
right to withdraw was “private property” under a contract theory and necessitating just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 49-50.  The District Court for the North District of California agreed with the
plaintiffs and declared Congress’s revocation of the right to opt-out unconstitutional.  Id. at 51.  In reversing
the decision, the Supreme Court held that the “the ‘contractual right’ at issue . . . bears little resemblance
to rights held to constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.”  Id. at 55.  “The
provision,” the Court continued, “constituted neither a debt of the United States, nor an obligation . . . to
provide benefits under a contract for which the obligee paid a monetary premium[.]”  Id. (citations omitted).
Rather, the reservation of rights clause, which permits the alteration or amendment of the Act, conferred
authority on Congress to revoke the opt-out provision without violating the Fifth Amendment.  Id.
Unfortunately, Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment provides little insight on the
nature of the right inherent in the benefits plan itself.  Considering that the old age insurance system does
“provide benefits . . . for which the obligee paid a monetary premium,” id. at 55, it would certainly appear
the case in fact further supports a contract based analysis.  Id. at 55.  At the most, the case stands for the
proposition that Congress may exercise its authority under the Reservation of Rights Clause to alter the Act
and, upon alteration, further modify non-benefit related provisions without compensation.  It certainly
would be a leap to conclude that a contributor has no interest in all future benefits merely on the grounds
that Congress may rescind a portion of an amendment which does not alter the underlying transaction.
“It comports better than any substitute we have discovered with the American concept
that free men want to earn their security and not ask for doles—that what is due as a
matter of earned right is far better than a gratuity . . . .  Social Security is not a handout;
it is not charity; it is not relief.  It is an earned right based upon the contributions and
earnings of the individual.  As an earned right, the individual is eligible to receive his
benefit in dignity and self-respect.”173
Nor was Justice Black impressed by Congress’s reservation of the right
to “alter, amend, or repeal” the Act.174  This right, he explained, while a
properly retained power, could not be applied to “disappoint[ ] the just
expectations of the contributors to the fund which the Government has
compelled them and their employers to pay its Treasury.”175  Justice Black
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177. Id. at 625 (Black, J., dissenting).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000).
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180. The Social Security Administration itself recommends that the benefits be considered part of
the overall financial planning for retirement:  “Remember!  Social Security is an important part of your
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05-10024], available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10024.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
181. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
clarified that the reservation of rights, so important to the majority, meant
nothing more than the power to terminate the program in the future, to cease
covering new people, or even to cease increasing its obligations to existing
contributors.176  But to terminate payments to an existing obligee is forbidden
by the Fifth Amendment.177
A congressional intention to reserve the right to alter or amend the Social
Security Act178 deserves no greater deference than Amtrak’s authorizing
statute or implied unilateral contracts in employment situations.  In many
respects, the equities found in employment situations, whether as an
enforcement of an obligation or a remedy for reliance, are even more
justifiable in Social Security.  With an institution backed by the good faith and
credit of the federal government, far more stable than virtually any employer,
and having provided systematic payments for nearly seventy years, even when
in crisis,179 the full circumstances appear far more likely to have created an
implied promise enforceable as a contract than an employee benefits
case—especially where the government itself encourages reliance on future
Social Security benefits.180
ii.  Charles Reich and the New Property Theory
In 1964, Professor Charles A. Reich proposed a radical new theory on
welfare systems.181  Called “New Property,” Professor Reich proposed that the
pervasiveness of government social programs, which he termed largess,
created a constitutionally protected property right in the beneficiaries.  As one
foundation of his theory, Reich rationalized that the expansion of the
government, and more specifically its largess through both welfare programs
and commercial contracts, was taking the place of private property.
The Great Depression led economists to fear a rapid increase in the
nation’s savings rate.  The belief that an excessive savings rate would cause
a permanent depression persisted until the 1940s.  Social Security, they
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183. Id. at 22.
184. In 1977, the wage base rate was $16,500.  DERTHICK, supra note 38, at 432.
185. Feldstein, supra note 182, at 23.
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argued, would promote full employment by reducing the need for future
savings.182  A simple example used by Harvard economics professor Martin
Feldstein explains the effect:
For most Americans, the social security program is the major form of saving.
Consider, for example, an individual with an income of $10,000 who, in the absence of
social security, would wish to save 10 percent of his total income for his old age.  With
social security, such an individual would not have to do any saving at all for his
retirement.  He need save only to buy consumer durables and to have a cash balance for
emergencies.  Similarly, an individual with an income of $20,000 who, in the absence of
social security, would want to save 10 percent of his income (or $2,000), finds that social
security now involves compulsory savings of about $1,800.  He would therefore need to
save only an additional $200 instead of $2,000.183
Professor Feldstein’s numbers, while outdated due to increases in the
maximum taxable wage rate since 1977,184 are illustrative of a basic concept:
Social Security causes, for the rational consumer, an adjustment in voluntary
savings (and correlatively spending) in an inverse relationship based upon the
amount of compulsory savings under the old-age insurance plan.  As Social
Security withholdings and benefits rise, individual retirement savings decline.
In 1971, Professor Feldstein evaluated the effects of Social Security on
private wealth.  He estimated the value of this Social Security “wealth”
embodied in the old-age annuity of the Social Security system and compared
it with total private wealth.  His results were quite startling.  He estimated that
Social Security wealth, a term he reports he felt comfortable using because it
was perfectly rational for households to rely on the expectation of receiving
benefits upon retirement, was approximate $2 trillion.185  By contrast, the
stock of private wealth was estimated at $3 trillion.  Professor Feldstein
concluded “social security may have reduced the stock of private wealth by
about 40 percent.”186
Criticism in the Senate during the debates over passage of the Social
Security Act evidenced congressional awareness of the likely effect that the
old-age insurance plan would have on private wealth generally and private
pensions in particular.  Senator George stated:
896 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:865
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benefits owed as opposed to accumulated in anticipation of future promises made.
189. Geoffrey N. Calvert, Contrasting Economic Impact of OASDI and Private Pension Plans, in
PENSION RES. COUNCIL, SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS:  COMPETITIVE OR
COMPLEMENTARY? 57-58 (Dan M. McGill ed., 1977).
190. Reich, The New Property, supra note 181.
191. Id. at 734-37.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 734.
194. Id. at 734-35.
195. See id. at 735-36.
196. See id. at 771-86.
Let me say that it was argued in committee that the private pension systems might still
be maintained.  I submit as a matter of plain common sense that the private systems will
not, in fact, be maintained if the employers are subjected to a tax which they must in any
event pay for the purpose of setting up an exactly similar system, or a system that has for
its objectives the same general purpose.187
That Social Security would, in fact, reduce the quantity of private savings
was one of the underlying economic rationales for creation of the pay-as-you-
go, or pay-go, system.188  It was a bulwark principle of Keynesian economics
that the gap between excessive savings and inadequate capital expenditure
caused economic depression.189  While the continued viability of this
economic theory is beyond the scope of this article, the legal impact has
significant implications.
“Government is a gigantic siphon,” Professor Reich, advocate of the New
Property theory, explains, “[i]t draws in revenue and power, and pours forth
wealth . . . .”190  This wealth takes many forms:  licenses, services, contracts,
subsidies, franchises, and benefits.191  The government, through direct and
indirect means, controls large portions of the marketplace creating and
conferring wealth to much of the nation.192  Social Security benefits, veteran’s
benefits, unemployment compensation, and the whole welfare scheme mean
that “[f]or a large number of people, government is a direct source of income
although they hold no public job.”193  Occupational licenses and franchises
confer rights to work in a given field and legal protections from
encroachment.194  Government contracts and subsidies are direct payments to
engage or refrain from desirable or undesirable actions.195
Professor Reich contends the scope of the government’s actions in the
marketplace demands a new paradigm.  Although the government’s interaction
with the nation’s economy is nothing new, the pervasiveness of the largess
means the old rules are no longer adequate.196  “In many cases, dependence
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199. Id. at 738.
200. Id. at 768 (“[W]ealth that flows from government is held by its recipients conditionally, subject
to confiscation in the interest of the paramount state.”).
201. See id. at 769-70.
202. Id. at 769.
203. See id. at 783-86.  Professor Reich explained:
Government largess, like all wealth, must necessarily be regulated in the public interest.  But
regulation must take account of the dangers of dependence, and the need for a property base for civil
liberties.  Rightly conceived, the public interest is no justification for the erosion of freedom that
has resulted from the present system of government largess.
Id. at 777.
[on largess] is not voluntary. . . .  The taxpayer is a participant in [Social
Security] by compulsion, and his ability to care for his own needs
independently is correspondingly reduced.”197  Similarly, the government has
monopoly control in generation of licenses, public transportation, and public
lands.  Even dependence on technology, largely the product of government
research, means an even greater dependence on the government.198  “[T]oday
more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or status rather than of
tangible goods.”199
Pointing to Flemming v. Nestor, Professor Reich explains that current law
provides inadequate protections for wealth that is generated and conferred by
government’s largess.200  He equated the denial of an “accrued property right”
to a feudal society, even a communist society, where indefeasible rights in
property do not exist.201
The implications of Flemming v. Nestor are profound.  No form of government
largess is more personal or individual than an old age pension.  No form is more clearly
earned by the recipient, who, together with his employer, contributes to the Social
Security fund during the years of his employment.  No form is more obviously a
compulsory substitute for private property; the tax on wage earner and employer might
readily have gone to higher pay and higher private savings instead.  No form is more
relied on, and more often thought of as property.202
Consequently, Professor Reich called for greater acknowledgment of
individual rights in government and expansion of constitutional principles to
protect the same.203  In 1964, it was appropriate to view the application of the
existing constitutional principles to Social Security as an “expansion” of the
law.  Forty years later, it is now far more appropriate to describe the law’s
application to Social Security as a recognition of the rights inherent to the
program and the appropriateness of their constitutional protection.
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204. Richard J. Pierce, The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990’s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973,
1982 (1996) (“Goldberg, and its welfare context, represented the high water mark.”); Richard B. Stewart,
Madison’s Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 347 (1990); cf. Richard A. Epstein, No New Property, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 747 (1990) (describing the importance of Goldberg v. Kelly as “at the very top of second-
tier” of important Supreme Court cases due to its impact on welfare jurisprudence).
205. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
206. Id. at 255-56.  “AFDC was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 . . . .  It is a
categorical assistance program supported by federal grants-in-aid but administered by the States according
to the regulations of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.”  Id. at 256 n.1.
207. See id. at 258-60.  Of course, this being a claim against a state authority, as opposed to a federal
authority, the due process protection claimed by the plaintiffs was that provided by the Fourteenth
Amendment.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property,
without due process of law.”).
208. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261.
iii.  Modern Entitlements:  The Post-Nestor Progeny of Goldberg v. Kelly
The “New Property” theory achieved some recognition in Supreme Court
jurisprudence.  In what has been termed the “high water mark” of welfare due
process protections,204 the Court granted property protections to welfare
recipients based upon a concept of entitlement.  Centered around a theory of
constitutional protections for state law created property rights, the post-Nestor
developments in welfare jurisprudence assume a critical role in understanding
the continued viability, or more accurately the lack thereof, of the court’s
analysis in Nestor.  Welfare benefits are the epitome of Professor Reich’s
governmental largess as welfare benefits are provided solely through the
government’s beneficence.  Social Security, by contrast, is an earned right.
Logic dictates that any property interests recognized by the Court for welfare
recipients should be more ephemeral than those “bought” through contribution
as in Social Security.  Yet, just ten years after refusing to recognize any
protectable rights for Social Security recipients, the Supreme Court first found
constitutional protections for welfare beneficiaries in Goldberg v. Kelly.205
In Goldberg v. Kelly, New York State sought to terminate a federally-
assisted welfare program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) without prior notice or a hearing.206  Existing city laws provided for
post-termination relief in the form of a “fair hearing,” but, the plaintiffs
argued, this safeguard against improper termination was inadequate to provide
due process protections afforded under the Constitution.207  The Court
agreed.208
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209. Id. at 264 (citation omitted).
210. Id. at 263 n.10
See also, for example, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (seizure of
mislabeled vitamin product); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908)
(seizure of food not fit for human use); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (adoption of
wartime price regulations) . . . .  In Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, [367 U.S
886,] 896 [(1961)], summary dismissal of a public employee was upheld because “[i]n [its]
proprietary military capacity, the Federal Government, . . . has traditionally exercised unfettered
control,” and because the case involved the Government’s “dispatch of its own internal affairs.”
Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
Id.
211. Id. at 264.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 262 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969)).
214. Id. (footnote omitted).
215. Id. at 262 n.8.
216. Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare:  The Engaging Legal Issues, 74 YALE
L.J. 1245 (1965) (expanding on Reich’s New Property theory which had been published the year before).
It held that “when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.”209
Distinguishing its earlier precedent where it found a post-termination hearing
sufficient to satisfy the individual’s due process rights,210 the Court
determined that termination of welfare deserved special protections.
Expressing a concern that “[f]or qualified recipients, welfare provides the
means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care,”211 the
Court reasoned that an individual ought not to be left destitute while awaiting
a post-termination hearing.  Due process does not mean that the government
“may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he
waits”212 for his right to be heard.  Rejecting an argument that public
assistance is a privilege and not a right,213 the Court explained:  “Such benefits
are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.”214
The Supreme Court, in a footnote which had the potential to change the
very definition of property in the United States, suggested this statutory grant
was, in fact, “more like ‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’”215  Quoting Charles A.
Reich’s Individual Rights and Social Welfare:  The Emerging Legal Issues,216
the Court suggested:
“[S]ociety today is built around entitlement.  The automobile dealer has his franchise, the
doctor and lawyer their professional licenses, the worker his union membership, contract,
and pension rights, the executive his contract and stock options; all are devices to aid
security and independence.  Many of the most important of these entitlements now flow
from government:  subsidies to farmers and businessmen, routes for airlines and channels
for television stations; long term contracts for defense, space, and education; social
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217. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8 (quoting Reich, supra note 214, at 1255) (emphasis added).
218. Id.
219. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 578.
224. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
225. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979) (horse trainer’s license); Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438 (1979)
(lawyer’s right to appear pro hac vice).
226. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1982).
227. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
security pensions for individuals.  Such sources of security, whether private or public,
are no longer regarded as luxuries or gratuities; to the recipients they are essentials, fully
deserved and in no sense a form of charity.  It is only the poor whose entitlements,
although recognized by public policy, have not been effectively enforced.”217
The Supreme Court was taking notice that traditional common law definitions
of property were inadequate to explain the nature of wealth in the country.218
Its holding in Goldberg recognized that expanded constitutional protections
were necessary to reflect the realities of the modern economy.
The Supreme Court expanded the Goldberg holding into a complete
entitlement concept just two years later in Board of Regents v. Roth.219  The
Court explained that “[p]roperty interests . . . are not created by the
Constitution.  Rather, they are created . . . [by] an independent source such as
state law. . . .”220  For the plaintiffs in Goldberg, the Court continued, the
welfare statute defined eligibility for benefits which, if qualified to continue
to receive them, were subject to constitutional protections as property.221
Enunciating the rule, the Court explained:  “To have a property interest in a
benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.
He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it.  He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”222
Although ultimately the Court found that Roth failed to show that he had
more than a unilateral expectation of continued employment as a professor,223
the entitlement analysis has been applied to other property interests including
civil service employment,224 professional licenses,225 and even public school
attendance.226  Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court, in Mathews v.
Eldridge, found that receipt of Social Security disability benefits, albeit only
continued receipt, is a “statutorily created ‘property’ interest protected by the
Fifth Amendment.”227
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228. Id.
229. During the congressional debates over passage of the Act, one Senator explained to a critical
colleague:  “The purpose of the bill, as I understand, is to declare a new policy in this Nation; namely, that
when people arrive at the age of 65 years they shall have, in effect, the right to retire.”  102 CONG. REC.
S9528 (daily ed. June 18, 1935) (statement of Sen. Tydings).
230. Brown, supra note 40, at 3.  Brown’s co-drafter Murray Latimer is reported as having described
the system as one where “[t]hese younger employees would expect their contributions to purchase not only
future annuities, but the removal of older workers and an increase the rate of promotion.”  GRAEBNER,
supra note 34, at 188 (citing A Bill to Alleviate the Hazards of Old Age Unemployment, Illness, and
Dependency to Establish a Social Insurance Board in the Department of Labor, to Raise Revenue, and for
Other Purposes:  Hearings on S. 1130 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong. 744-45 (1935)).
231. Brown, supra note 40, at 3.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 4.  E.g., DERTHICK, supra note 38, at 21 (describing some basic dogmas in the operation
of the Social Security system:  that “people must qualify for benefits by making contributions (paying
taxes)” and “[h]aving paid their contributions, they or their dependents should get benefits as a matter of
right”).
234. See discussion supra note 173 and accompanying text.
IV.  PERVASIVENESS AND RELIANCE:  SOCIAL SECURITY AS A RIGHT
The property right identified in the Goldberg-Roth-Mathews line of cases
is not absolute.  Rather, the Court found the protected right exists in the
continuation of a benefit that have already begun.228  But unlike welfare
payments or job tenure, which vest only after a determination of eligibility or
mutuality of expectation has amassed, Social Security, as a very element of its
creation, is a right earned before payments begin.
Although Congress passed the Social Security Act in large part to address
the nation’s problems of unemployment by encouraging retirement,229 its
design represented the implementation of a radical new political philosophy
concerning governmental intervention.230  J. Douglas Brown attests that Social
Security was founded on the theory that “American Citizens had a right to
protection against distress caused by economic conditions beyond their
control.”231  It was on this foundation that the Committee on Economic
Security established the “old-age insurance system that would provide benefits
as a matter of right.”232  However, the right, as envisioned, was not granted to
the elderly as a class of people, “but to each individual who had by his own
contribution developed an individual right.”233  The 1935 congressional
debates, cited in Justice Black’s Flemming v. Nestor dissent, bear out this
conclusion.234
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235. See Brown, supra note 40, at 4-5.
236. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 414(a) (2000).
237. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (2000).  By no means does Social Security pay beneficiaries in direct
proportion to the amount contributed.  While many commentators decry the regressive aspects of the Social
Security system, see, e.g., Joseph A. Pechman, The Social Security System:  An Overview, in THE CRISIS
IN SOCIAL SECURITY:  PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 31, 33-35 (Michael J. Baskin ed., 2d ed. 1978), the plain
facts are that “benefits are weighted heavily in favor of the lower paid or short service worker.”  Paul H.
Jackson, Philosophical Basis of the Private Pension Movement, in PENSION RES. COUNSEL, SOCIAL
SECURITY AND PRIVATE PENSION PLANS:  COMPETITIVE OR COMPLEMENTARY? 14, 18 (Dan M. McGill ed.,
1977).
238. YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT, supra note 24.
239. Brown, supra note 40, at 4.  The drafters did use alleviation of poverty as a means to ensure the
new program would withstand constitutional scrutiny.  See discussion supra notes 46-52 & 61-66 and
accompanying text.
240. Of course a person can fail to qualify for Social Security by choosing to not work, but for those
working, employers are legally obligated to remit Social Security withholdings.  The fact that some may
decide not to work is immaterial as I only explore the protectable interests of those who have made
sufficient contribution to the Social Security system to qualify for benefits.
241. Joel F. Handler, “Constructing the Political Spectacle”:  The Interpretation of Entitlements,
Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 916 (1990).
242. Id.
Individualization is codified within the very benefits structure of the old-
age insurance system.235  Individuals must qualify for retirement benefits
based on a minimum level of contributions over a set period of time.236  And
benefit payments are not fixed by class of recipients, but instead increase with
a worker’s increased contributions.237  Underscoring this individualization is
the personalized Social Security Statement, sent out to all taxpayers, that
informs “[w]e [the Social Security Administration] can’t provide your actual
benefit amount until you apply for benefits.”238
While application for benefits is necessary, Social Security is not welfare.
The original drafters of the Social Security Act were concerned with
prevention of poverty, not the alleviation of poverty.239  Consequently, they
created an insurance system where a guaranteed minimum level of income is
assured to retirees who contributed to the system.  This is in contrast to a
welfare system, designed to improve specific conditions caused by poverty.
One is entitled to receive Social Security upon retirement merely by satisfying
two conditions which are generally fulfilled as a matter of course:
contribution through taxation,240 mandated by law and carried out by the
employer, and reaching a specified age.
This formulation was essential to the program envisioned in 1935 by
President Roosevelt.241  To Roosevelt, the old-age insurance program
inherently depended on actuarial soundness and a distinction from welfare.242
“He believed that the program would only attain solid legitimacy if it was
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243. Id.
244. Id. at 917.  See also supra note 38 and accompanying text.
245. See Edward Cowan, Background and History:  The Crisis in Public Finance and Social
Security, in THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY:  PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 1, 11 (Michael J. Baskin ed., 2d
ed. 1978) (“[Some] argue strongly that public attitudes toward the payroll tax depend largely on their
continued perception of the program as primarily committed to earned benefits.”).
Although a full exploration of alternative theories is beyond the scope of this article, it is appropriate
to note that not all commentators support the Reich-esque position of Social Security as a property right.
In her recent paper on the Social Security privatization debate, Patricia E. Dilley rejects the New Property
theory and proposes that Social Security is a right because it is essential to the right of retirement.  Dilley,
supra note 36, at 1024.  For Dilley, to consider Social Security as merely a property right under the New
Property theory inadequately explains the nature of the benefit.  Id. at 1023.  She describes the claim to
Social Security benefits as a “statutory claim, created by past work effort of the individual, on a portion of
the future productivity of the work force at large and unmediated by any equity interest.”  Id. at 1022-23.
Exploring the very foundations of the Social Security benefit and the nature of interest in future benefits
held by the individual taxpayer, Dilley explains that the “public perception, which is supported by a broad
based political will to maintain Social Security generally, and individual benefits in particular, in fact
creates a real right whose existence is necessary to protect the public institution of retirement.”  Id. at 1024.
246. George F. Break, Social Security as a Tax, in THE CRISIS IN SOCIAL SECURITY:  PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS 107, 120 (Michael J. Baskin ed., 2d ed. 1978).
247. Id.
248. Id.
‘earned,’ if it was financed by contribution, if it had no means test, if it clearly
defined the risks, and if it had a fixed retirement age.”243  The dignity of an
earned right was necessary to avoid the stigma of welfare244 and achieve the
program’s widespread acceptance.
A number of commentators hold the position that continued viability of
the Social Security system depends on a consumer’s belief in the earned
benefit.245  Should revenues be contributed from the general treasury, for
example, the perceived bright-line connection between contribution and
benefit would become blurred.  George Break, professor of Economics
emeritus at the University of California at Berkeley, projects that a tri-partite
financing would result in fluctuating government contributions based on the
economy’s health and proposals to reduce benefits for the wealthy or create
earnings tests.246  “Longtime contributors to the system—quite rightly—would
see such proposals as abrogating the implicit contract under which they
thought they had been providing for their own retirement and other needs.”247
The political power of some of these disenchanted would bring about their
own release from mandatory contribution.  In turn, the program would simply
become another federal welfare program.248
From the moment of its inception, the leaders of the Social Security
Administration worked hard to depict Social Security as “insurance” in order
904 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65:865
249. DERTHICK, supra note 38, at 199.
250. Id.
251. Dilley, supra note 36, at 1033 (footnote omitted).
252. Patton, supra note 53, at 152.
253. Id. at 153 (quoting a 1976 Social Security Administration Booklet).  Patton also cites a booklet
he received along with his Social Security card which stated:  “Your card shows the number of your Social
Security account.  It is necessary to identify the account as belonging to you.”  Id.
to secure the public’s acceptance of the program.249  In her seminal book on
the political development of Social Security, Martha Derthick, director of
Governmental Affairs for the Brookings Institution, explained this was a
conscious decision.  “[B]ecause it implied a return in proportion to
investment, it satisfied a widely held conception of fairness; and because it
implied the existence of a contract, it appeared sound and certain.”250
For President Roosevelt, creating an aura of individual entitlement
accomplished a slightly more practical goal:  ensuring the program would not
end up another casualty of politics following his departure from office.
Commenting on the decision to fund the plan through equal contributions by
employers and individuals, he remarked:  “We put those payroll contributions
there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral and political right to collect
their pensions and their unemployment benefits.  With those taxes in there, no
damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”251  Roosevelt
intended to create a “legal, moral and political right” so that taxpayers would
fight to protect their future benefits—to fight for those benefits and to win.
In 1978, Carl Patton, director of the Bureau of Economic and Regional
Planning Research at the University of Illinois, commenting on the crisis of
Social Security solvency, wrote:  “Most Americans think social security is a
contributory insurance system from which they will receive benefits after
reaching age 65.  Many people believe their social security number is a
retirement deposit account number—like a bank account number—which
identifies a specific accumulation of funds.”252  Patton criticized the Social
Security Administration for doing little to combat this myth, even when it
describes the system:
“The basic idea of social security is a simple one:  During working years employees, their
employers, and self-employed people pay social security contributions into special trust
funds.  When earnings stop or are reduced because the worker retires, dies or becomes
disabled, monthly cash benefits are paid from these funds to replace part of the earnings
the family has lost.”253
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254. Id.  See also Dilley, supra note 32, at 1082 (“Supporters of Social Security . . . actively promoted
the public belief that each worker was in effect ‘saving’ for retirement . . . and that each worker’s benefits
in retirement were essentially a payout of the worker’s contributions to the Social Security trust funds.”).
255. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. L. NO. 05-10024, supra note 180, at 6.  The most notable change is that
the description no longer makes mention of the trust funds; for that one has to look elsewhere.  See SOC.
SEC. ADMIN., PUB. L. NO. 65-008, SOCIAL SECURITY HANDBOOK § 1403.2, available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OP_Home/handbook/handbook.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (“During working years, employees, their
employers, and the self-employed pay Social Security and/or Medicare taxes.  The equivalent of these taxes
is pooled in special trust funds under automatic appropriation by Congress.”).
256. YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT, supra note 24, at 2 (“You have earned enough credits to
qualify for benefits.  At your current earnings rate, if you stop working . . . at age 62, your payment would
be about . . . $[dollar amount].”).
257. Id. (“We based your benefit estimates on these facts . . . .”).
He contends that statements such as these leave the majority of people with
the impression that they are saving for their own retirement as if they
contributed to a guaranteed annuity program.254
Surprisingly, such criticisms, and the continued problems with the
solvency of the Social Security system, have failed to spur significant changes.
Today, in the Social Security Administration’s pamphlet “Understanding the
Benefits,” the system is described in almost identical terms.  It states:
Social Security is based on a simple concept.  When you work, you pay taxes into the
Social Security system, and when you retire or you become disabled, you, your spouse
and your dependent children receive monthly benefits that are based on your earnings.
And, your survivors collect benefits when you die.255
The explicit assertion criticized by Patton, that revenues are placed into
a trust fund, has been removed, but the annual statement still describes the
program and the future payment of benefits in unequivocal terms.  Any
reasonable reading of the annual statement’s claim that “when you retire . . .
you . . . receive monthly benefits that are based on your earnings” yields but
one conclusion:  that following a career of contributions payments will be
forthcoming.
The Social Security Administration’s augmentation of the belief that old-
age insurance is “earned and owed” to the individual, a concept antithetical
to the position that Social Security depends on government’s continued
beneficence and can be terminated at any time, does not end there.  The annual
statement notifies the individual whether or not they qualified for benefits.256
The statement even estimates an individual’s future income in order to predict
a specific dollar amount in retirement benefits that the contributor is likely to
receive.257
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258. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
259. See YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY STATEMENT, supra note 24, at 1.
260. As a point of fairness to the Social Security Administration, the statement does tell the taxpayer
that “by 2042 the Social Security Trust Fund will be exhausted,” and “[a]t that point, there will be enough
to pay only about 73 cents for each dollar of scheduled benefits.”  Id.  But this report, joined with the rest
of the paragraph discussing possible changes in the law that might effect the benefit amount, does not dispel
the conclusion that taxpayers will receive something at retirement in exchange for their contributions during
their working life—a guarantee that can only be met through reformation of the current program.
261. Id. at 2.
262. Id. (“These estimates are in today’s dollars.  After you start receiving benefits, they will be
adjusted for cost-of-living increases.”).
263. At age twenty-nine, I was assured that I had already earned enough credits to qualify for benefits.
264. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. L. NO. 05-10024, supra note 180, at 7.  The Social Security
Administration’s failure to dispel reliance on retirement benefits following a public commitment by one of
“It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those
claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be
arbitrarily undermined.”258  Why doesn’t the Social Security Administration’s
own attempt at hedging the expectations for the future of Social Security259
succeed in defeating the reliance?
The statement only says that the Social Security Administration cannot
predict the benefit amount and lists three reasons why such a prediction is not
possible.  Those reasons include a change in the individual’s actual earnings
before retirement, benefit changes caused by changes in the current law260 and
other factors such as other pensions not covered by Social Security (military
and railroad employment).  Yet under all of these possibilities lies the promise
that if the individual does continue to work, she will receive benefits in her
retirement; if the individual has worked the requisite number of quarters, the
statement informs:  “You have earned enough credits to qualify for
benefits.”261  Not only that, but the statement even assures that the specific
benefit dollar amounts predicted for the individual taxpayer “will be adjusted
for cost-of-living increases” prior to retirement.262  A contributor to Social
Security is not merely led to believe that retirement benefits are likely, but that
they are forthcoming.263  The cognoscenti may understand the tenuousness of
old-age insurance, but the Social Security Administration certainly strives to
assure the public that payments are virtually guaranteed.
It seems even more difficult for the government to make the case that it
does not induce reliance on the future of Social Security when the Social
Security Administration itself recommends that the benefits be considered part
of the overall financial planning for retirement:  “Remember!  Social Security
is an important part of your financial planning and helps you maintain your
standard of living.”264
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its directors to do just that, provides additional insight into the grip Social Security maintains on the
American psyche.  See Deborah Churchman, Dorcas Hardy’s Stamp on Social Security, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Mar. 5, 1987, at 29.
Social security is an insurance policy that people have come to rely on for retirement—which is a
mistake, she says.  “If I have one responsibility, it’s to remind [the baby boom generation, heading
toward retirement] that the one with the primary responsibility to the individual’s future is that
individual.”  (alterations in original).
265. Geoffrey N. Calvert, Contrasting Economic Impact of OASDI and Private Pension Plans, in
PENSION RES. COUNCIL, supra note 40, at 57, 59.
266. Id.
267. The AARP, formerly known as the American Association of Retired Persons, is a 35 million
member non-profit organization dedicated to addressing the needs and interests of people fifty-years-old
and older.  AARP, Fact Sheet, at http://www.aarp.org/leadership/Articles/a2002-12-18-aarpfactsheet.html
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
Statements such as these have brought about one of the basic tenets of
Reich’s “New Property” theory—government largess as a replacement for
individual wealth.  “The individual has little reason to do much . . . saving any
more.”265  Social Security and employee benefits plans are looked at as a
substitute “generally do[ing] a more systematic and efficient job of providing
security to the worker and his family than he could do on his own.”266
V.  CONCLUSION
So where does this leave Social Security’s contributors should Congress
fail to avoid the program’s ever approaching fiscal crisis?  Although Social
Security is more than a mere “unfunded promise,” underwritten by the
generosity of the federal government, even the expectation and right to receive
payments after retirement does not guarantee payments will be made.  With
all due regard for the political weight of the AARP,267 Congress retains the
authority to terminate Social Security if it so chooses.  But in spite of the
Supreme Court’s outdated case law, it is clear that termination of the program
and the attendant cessation of current and future benefits will directly
implicate the Fifth Amendment due process rights of Social Security’s
contributors.
While due process case law provides a basis for determining the
constitutional implications of any governmental action effecting Social
Security, the remedy provided by the Due Process Clause, that is a hearing
before termination, is clearly insufficient to meet the needs of the individual
contributor.  A hearing is generally only beneficial in identifying the nature
and scope of the property interest with an eye towards fashioning a remedy,
assuming the authority to execute the taking already exists.  Furthermore, the
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268. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 241 (1999) (holding due process satisfied
when individual receives notice of post-seizure remedies through “published, generally available state
statutes and case law”).
269. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-33 (2003).
270. Of course whether or not avoiding the impeding Social Security crisis constitutes a public
purpose, let alone whether there is an imminent crisis, is a matter of debate.  Compare discussion supra Part
I with discussion supra Part II.D.ii.  The Congressional Budget Office, however, has estimated that in less
than thirty years federal spending on the combined burden of Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare will
constitute nearly two-thirds of federal budget and approximately fifteen percent of the nation’s gross
domestic product—double the current proportion.  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY:  A PRIMER,
5 (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter CBO, A PRIMER], available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/32xx/doc3213/EntireReport.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).  Alone, spending on Social Security is estimated reach nearly 6.5% of the gross
domestic product by 2030.  Id. at i & 6 fig.2.
271. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 387 & n.17 (1980) (noting
compensation for unconstitutional takings is an exception to the general rule that interest is not awarded
in satisfaction of claims against the United States).
272. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 574 (1937).
Supreme Court has held that the requirements of due process are satisfied
through the legislative process.268  As a consequence, the due process clause
would appear to be satisfied provided Congress identifies a sufficient remedy
for the termination of a contributor’s benefits.  So rather than providing the
means to fashion a remedy, the due process case law offers the vehicle to
identify the property rights attendant with an individual’s contributions to
Social Security.  Once a constitutional right to Social Security benefits is
established, it is the Just Compensation Clause, rather than the Due Process
Clause, that provides the appropriate starting place for any remedies
discussion.
Although  the government has the authority to confiscate private property,
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes two
conditions on such confiscation:  the taking must be for a “public use” and the
owner of the confiscated property must receive “just compensation.”269  As for
the “public use” requirement, there is little doubt that any attempt to avert a
budgetary melt-down, would constitute a public use.270  On its face, the
required just compensation appears equally as straightforward—the
government would be obligated to remit, at a minimum, the amount
contributed by participants, plus interest.271  Yet the equation becomes far
more complicated when trying to account for the payroll contributions from
employers.  Is the government required to return this amount to the employers
who paid it, or to the employees who, economically speaking, sacrificed
additional wages in exchange for the employer’s tax?  It may be that the
original language of the Social Security Act identifying employer
contributions as an excise tax,272 rather than an income tax, warrants
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government retention of the tax proceeds.  This distinction, after all, was
critical in the Court’s ruling on Social Security’s constitutionality.273
Notwithstanding the challenges in formulating the “just compensation,”
it seems quite clear that a remedy is possible.  Such a realization can only lead
to one conclusion:  Congress can terminate Social Security at will.  Of course
both the political and economic ramifications of Social Security’s termination
make such action laughably remote.  Far more likely is a measured plan to
extend Social Security’s solvency and to guarantee payments to the nation’s
retirees into the indefinite future.  Unfortunately, overlooked in the Social
Security debate is the fact that many of the various proposals to reform Social
Security, such as raising the retirement age and the creation of private
retirement accounts, risk impinging the very same rights that prohibit the
programs complete termination without providing “just compensation.”
Does the Fifth Amendment permit Congress to raise the retirement age
retroactively to apply to current Social Security contributors?  Or would such
action interfere with the property interest of an individual who “bought in”
with the prospect of receiving retirement benefits at a specific age?  If
individuals were permitted to invest their Social Security withholdings in
private investment accounts, would the government be responsible for any
losses incurred through such investments?274  Such changes to the rules of
Social Security such as the retirement age or the manner in which benefits are
calculated might be more appropriately analyzed as a regulatory taking, akin
to zoning ordinances which tend not to completely eliminate the value of the
underlying property, but rather affects the investment-backed expectations.275
No matter how unlikely, categorical termination of the Social Security
program provides the appropriate starting point for any analysis of the nature
of the interest a contributor holds in her future Social Security benefits.  As
the very concept of its creation, Social Security payments are a right which is
earned through contribution.  Social Security is not a welfare program
designed to provide the impoverished with the means for existence, but a
federal pension system more akin to a contract than an unfunded promise.
Both the individual and the employer purchase old-age insurance directly
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through tax contributions.  Payment into the program confers a right to receive
benefits simply upon reaching a specified age.
Reliance on this right is the rational economic result of the structure of
the program and even further encouraged by the government through its own
publications.  Social Security has the effect of reducing individual savings in
reliance on the expectation of future payments.  And even though Social
Security has faced funding crises, Congress has never contracted the program,
making such reliance wholly reasonable.
From the preceding discussion, certain facts about Social Security
become clear:  a qualified contributor to the old-age insurance plan has a right
to receive regular payments after retirement; these payments may not be
arbitrarily terminated by the government without due process of law and just
compensation; and Social Security’s future is in trouble—the Trustees
reported an actuarial deficit with total exhaustion of the trust fund in less than
fifty years.  As Justice Black commented:
[Congress] could repeal the Act so as to cease to operate its old-age insurance activities
for the future . . . .  [I]t could stop covering new people, and even stop increasing its
obligations to its old contributors.  But that is quite different from disappointing the just
expectations of the contributors to the fund . . . .276
Merely reserving the right to alter or amend the old-age insurance system does
not disclaim the very right that the Social Security Act was intended to create.
